This book explains the notational system NUSAP (Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, Pedigree) and applies it to several examples from the environmental sciences.

Extended antipaternalism means the use of antipaternalist arguments to defend activities that harm (consenting) others. As an example, a smoker’s right to smoke is often invoked in defence of the activities of tobacco companies. It can, however, be shown that antipaternalism in the proper sense does not imply such extended antipaternalism. We may therefore approve of Mill’s antipaternalist principle (namely, that the only reason to interfere with someone’s behaviour is to protect others from harm) without accepting activities that harm (consenting) (...) others. This has immediate consequences for the ethics of public health. An antipaternalist need not refrain from interfering with activities such as the marketing of tobacco or heroin, boxing promotion, driving with unbelted passengers, or buying sex from “voluntary” prostitutes. (shrink)

Implant ethics is defined here as the study of ethical aspects of the lasting introduction of technological devices into the human body. Whereas technological implants relieve us of some of the ethical problems connected with transplantation, other difficulties arise that are in need of careful analysis. A systematic approach to implant ethics is proposed. The major specific problems are identified as those concerning end of life issues (turning off devices), enhancement of human capabilities beyond normal levels, mental changes and personal (...) identity, and cultural effects. (shrink)

The history of the Russian Old Believers who lived in Ukraine, as well as the question of the main methods and features of the power struggle with representatives of this peculiar ethno-confessional group and the ways of their adaptation to the conditions that existed in the Russian Empire in the middle of the XIX century remain a little researched topic. So, we can talk about the scientific relevance of a particular problem.

This study investigated poultry farmers’ perceptions, preferences, and use of commercially compounded and self-compounded feeds in the Oyo Area of Oyo State, Nigeria. Data were collected from 120 poultry farmers through a structured interview schedule. The study concluded that poultry farmers prefer and use self-compounded feeds (SCF) instead of commercially compounded feeds (CCF) because (a) self-compounded feeds are of better quality than commercially compounded feeds, (b) there are no quality control measures in the poultry feed industry in the Oyo Area, (...) (c) commercially compounded feeds cost more than self-compounded feeds, and (d) farmers choose feed based on the perceived quality of the feed, their technical ability to produce feed by themselves, the cost of CCF, the storability of feed, and the cost and availability of transportation. Based on these findings, it is recommended that interested public and private agencies should organize annual extension workshops and training for poultry farmers in the study area on (a) feed formulation; (b) feed ingredient mixing and compounding; (c) selection of ingredients, mixtures, and additives; and (d) the establishment, operation, and maintenance of feed mills. Farmers should be encouraged to form feed mill cooperative societies. The performance of the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON) should be monitored and evaluated to ensure its effective oversight of quality standards for agricultural products and inputs such as feeds and feed ingredients. (shrink)

These volumes are reprinted without change, revision, or comment from the 1928 edition. Tennant set out with a largely empirical method to investigate the presuppositions of Christian theology. In the back of his mind was an arbitration between theology and science. His ethical theism makes room for a purposive creator and sustainer of the world. It makes room for an enduring soul but not for original sin. In a scheme that brings to mind some modern efforts at "natural theology," he (...) sees God, man, and the world as mutually requisite.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Jonathan and Paul Weiss, obviously enjoying themselves, spar with one another over everyday problems of ethical decisions and principles--problems which they have obviously discussed before and which they now air for our benefit, taking advantage of their prolonged and special relationship to avoid haggling over banalities and to present the fruits of dialogue without its heavy stalks. Although the two men are enjoying their talk, their tone is not frivolous. They reveal a deep and human concern with the issues they (...) are discussing. They are aware of their presuppositions but conscientiously avoid any philosophically compulsive examination of them. The result is that the lay reader is rewarded with strong substantive positions that deal squarely, even if not definitively, with the practical issues at hand. The format of the book is what appears to be a transcription of actual conversations about the individual, his obligations, the family, the state, society, and the universe. The conversations often seemed to be "staged," however, with one of them playing devil's advocate. They stick to the agenda and leave each issue when the time is up or when the discussion becomes unfruitful.--S. O. H. (shrink)

It is not always clear whose side Frankel is on in the current debate over university reform, but that is perhaps the hidden strength of the book. For, although the rational orderliness with which he proceeds seems to indicate that he leans toward the establishment, he nonetheless, in the process, does manage occasionally to dig out the legitimacy of much of the radical position. Although his topic is the university in general, it is evident that in the back of his (...) mind is Columbia 1968. Although his sympathies are with the old order he manages with some reservations to catch a glimpse of what students are pushing for, especially in terms of the university's commitment to its immediate neighborhood, and student representation on board and faculty committees. Not that Frankel is for such representation, but he concedes that it is perhaps time to do a little experimenting in that direction.--S. O. H. (shrink)

There are sixty-two selections in this anthology. Most of them are around eight pages, none of them over eighteen pages, and a few running less than three. Although the passages are short, they are well selected. Each presents one or two provocative ideas without the laborious development and defense that so often discourages, bores, or stifles the enthusiasm of the student coming to the material for the first time. Practically all the selections are from nineteenth and twentieth century thinkers, although (...) Hume, Kant, Aquinas, Augustine, Anselm, Leibniz, and Spinoza are represented. There are seven main parts, each with a too brief introduction by the editors attempting to introduce and integrate the various selections within it. These parts cover the nature of religion, its relation to philosophy, the existence of God, the knowledge of God, religious language, the problem of evil, immortality and eschatology. Existential, analytic, confessional, and process thought are all represented. This second edition is larger and more up-to-date than the 1962 edition, with the nine deletions replaced with selections by Whitehead, Otto, van Buren, Kai Nielsen, and Ninian Smart. More attention is paid to the ontological argument. Schleiermacher's contribution has been changed, and Feuerbach's enlarged. Hartshorne now has an additional entry. The critical bibliographies of suggested readings after each section have been expanded and brought up to date.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This collection of essays was originally designed as an anthology of Lamprecht's earlier articles. However, about one third of the essays collected here are new for this volume and serve to integrate the old essays so that the volume has become "a record of the course of his thought... and a kind of epilogue to his career of philosophical speculation." For Lamprecht, naturalism is a "philosophical position, empirical in method, that regards everything that exists or occurs to be conditioned in (...) its existence or occurrence by causal factors within one all encompassing system of nature." The author seems to be uncomfortable in the face of extreme solutions to philosophic problems. He takes a mediating position between "determinacy and indeterminacy," "causality and contingency," the primacy of "subject-matter" and the primacy of "method." Lamprecht is at his best when exploring the implications of his theories rather than when defending them. His observations on freedom and necessity, the nature of man, the role of historiography in philosophy, and the question of religion bear a richness of insight that must be appreciated regardless of the reader's attitude toward the author's philosophical position.—S. O. H. (shrink)

"What is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking." Thus Heidegger sets the tone for these 1951 lectures indicating that he has in mind a special and lofty notion of thinking--a notion that can be understood only by following the master as he demonstrates how to think by showing what it is, after all, that calls for thinking. Heidegger sees thinking and Being as inextricably related, each the key to the other. Thinking is "relatedness (...) to Being." Furthermore, "only when man speaks does he think." Thus we must learn to listen, really listen, if we are to know what thinking is. Nietzsche looms as an important figure in this discussion, and the key to the understanding of Nietzsche, says Heidegger, is the concept of revenge. For Nietzsche, the bridge to the highest hope for man is his deliverance from revenge. Heidegger interprets this to mean that because revenge tries to affect the past and thus cannot understand time as a passing away, it is only through deliverance from revenge that man can be in proper orientation to time and thus to Being. The awkward translation of the title, Was Heisst Denken?, is justified by the text because Heidegger closely examines the German wording of the question--an examination which involves philosophical discussion of the notions of calling and naming. The latter sections of the book are an exhaustive--or should I say exhausting--exegesis of Parmenides' fragment 6: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ'ἒον ἔμμεναι. The translation starts out as the traditional "One should both say and think that Being is," and ends up through Heidegger's characteristic brand of creative etymology, as "useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so taking-to-heart, too: beings in being." That is, in order to think, we should allow things to be as they are, pay attention to what they are, and know that we are related to them.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Parker obviously has a warm fondness and a deep empathetic understanding of this period of history, and they are offered to the reader in every carefully worked sentence. In a narrative style that presents the human dimension as well as the central ideas of the Presocratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Parker imaginatively reconstructs the phenomenological, empirical, and the homely rationale for their theories. He depicts the Presocratics as organized around the question "What is the universe made of?" and Socrates around (...) "What is Truth, Justice, Goodness?" There is a chapter giving a profile of Athens and Sparta. The three chapters on Plato cover the theory of forms, the Republic, and the Laws. The four chapters on Aristotle, besides the biographical inclusions, cover a scheme of his works, his view of nature, The Ethics, The Politics, and his lasting impact on the rest of intellectual history. The book ends with a brief treatment of Hellenism and a conclusion that takes its cue from the awe and excitement of Keats in On First Looking into Chapman's Homer. Altogether it is a simplified yet sympathetic, thoughtful, and sensitive introduction.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Tout s’est passé très vite, prenant l’Église au dépourvu. Le mouvement pour la reconnaissance des mariages et des unions civiles entre personnes du même sexe a connu un succès extraordinaire. La hiérarchie de l’Église catholique oppose une fin de non-recevoir à toute reconnaissance positive des couples homosexuels, en invoquant une morale sexuelle qu’on dit ancienne et invariable,..

Where is the old Marcuse? Is he too tired to be explicit, to reason, to give a rationale for what he is contending? Why has he written this?--this which is just another protest lost in the shouting and the printing scattered all over stop signs, subway walls, placards, newspapers, magazines, and in books. Perhaps the importance of the book is its perseverance at a time when we are exhausted, worn out by protest's apparent sterility on the one hand and its (...) kiss-of-death fashionability on the other. Many places in this book are obscure because they are poorly written and poorly edited. Marcuse walks the line between being original enough to be provocative and irresponsible enough to be dismissed. The book is a fascinating interplay between sense and nonsense, penetrating insight and polemical overstatement, between creative originality and banal sloganism, between brilliant interpretive social commentary and abject confusion. Marcuse does succeed in letting the reader know that there is something wrong with our society and that many of the values that we have taken for granted must be rethought, but this is not Marcuse at his best, and the net force of the book is to leave the reader bewildered with this, another indication that these are bewildering times.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Responsible efforts by theologians to deal with the problem of language have been too few. Perhaps frightened by growling and unyielding logical positivists, theologians, with a few notable exceptions, have been generally reluctant to do the linguistic housecleaning necessary to keep up with the philosophical Joneses. However, the tempest of logical positivism has pretty well past, and theologians are beginning to poke their heads out and to clear away some of the linguistic debris. Although Macquarrie is not deluded into "thinking (...) that the retreat from an iconoclastic positivism leads automatically to a situation in which analysis makes a constructive contribution to the problems of theology," he does see five findings of the methodology of analysis that make for a more hospitable environment for reflections on theological discourse: The recognition of a multiplicity of languages. The distrust of reductionism that sanctions one single kind of language. The recognition of a diversity of meaning. The recognition of the efficacious use of indirect language. Recognition of the importance of the context of the situation out of which language arises. Macquarrie's intent is to explore the characteristics, the "logic," of uniquely theological language, and to see how such a language manifests the three characteristics of a discourse-situation in any language: expression, representation, communication. The situation out of which theological language grows and the key to its logic is the human discovery of human finitude and the encounter with Being precipitated by the discovery of the possibility of nonbeing. Macquarrie's debt to Heidegger is heavy and acknowledged. He discusses at length mythology, symbolism, analogy, empirical language, and the Heideggerian language of existence and being, as modes and types of theological language. One of the strengths of the book is Macquarrie's willingness to put his analytical method to work in a hermeneutical exercise examining some ancient and modern examples of theological discourse. Macquarrie announces at the end what had been implicit throughout: that the language of existence and being is the basic logic of theology. "Heidegger's attempt to move from existential into ontological language is most important and, if one accepts it, it constitutes a kind of paradigm or prototype for the language of theology."—S. O. H. (shrink)

This book is a primer of contemporary philosophy of religion. It introduces in non-technical simplicity the four basic philosophical options which can inform a modern religious posture. The options are: process philosophy, phenomenology, language analysis, and existentialism. There is an introductory essay by the editor which describes the attitudes of Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, and Tillich toward philosophy and its relation to theology. Hartshorne's essay on process philosophy sets forth the bare bones of his bipolar theism and presents his case that (...) it is necessary for the creatures to contribute to the enrichment of God. The phenomenology article is written by Quentin Lauer, S.J. He deals briefly with Husserl's methodology and its applicability to the investigation of "religious consciousness." He describes four styles of phenomenology of religion represented by James, Van der Leeuw, Otto, and Scheler. He also discusses briefly Teilhard de Chardin. In the next essay, Frederick Ferré uses Socrates as his point of departure for showing the relevance of language analysis for policing religious discourse, both theistic and christological. He is skeptical, however, as to whether language analysis can be considered a resource for Christian thought. He points out that because it is in the Socratic tradition it can better serve as a midwife. John Macquarrie contributes the chapter on existentialism, showing its anthropocentrism and its reluctance to develop a doctrine of God. All the essays, originally the Alden-Tuthill lectures at Chicago Theological Seminary, raise provocative, important, and basic questions. They would serve well as an introductory text or as a catalyst for class discussion.—S. O. H. (shrink)

Some members from the cast of New Essays in Philosophical Theology set the tone of this anthology, although with essays not included in that volume. The Flew-Hare-Mitchell-Crombie discussion on falsifiability is the only selection from that volume included here. Also included in the same section are Wisdom's "Gods," much of Braithwaite's Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief, and selections by Diogenes Allen and John Hick. The opening section of the book is on the logical status of religious language. (...) Besides essays by MacIntyre, McPherson, and Crombie, it contains William Christian's article on truth-claims in religion and also a clear, sympathetic account by Father Bochenski on the formal structure of religious discourse. The section of the book on the question of literalness includes selections from Ayer, Tillich, Mascall, Buber, and Bultmann. The section on the possibility of religious knowledge includes essays by Calvin O. Schrag, Paul F. Schmidt, and Kierkegaard. Santoni's introduction discusses all the essays, ties them together, and consequently gives a rationale for their inclusion. On the whole, the anthology is thorough, unified, and, in spite of its restricted and well-worn theme, remarkably nonrepetative.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This book is much in the tradition of Paul Goodman and Edgar Friedenberg in that it accepts their critique of what is wrong with American education. But then it goes on to share a utopian vision of how it could and should be--a vision featuring a Summerhill-like, multi-media, "total environment" approach where life from birth to death is dedicated to the joys of learning. Leonard is currently vice-president of Esalen Institute and a veteran magazine journalist on education. He has written (...) with considerable skill and passion a book that is as engrossing as a good novel. The book is intoxicating in its suggestion that perhaps there is some way to preserve and kindle the creative zest which all children are born with, without killing it as we do now by regimentation. Leonard not only spins out his own vision of the future, but does some first class reporting on current experiments which point the way to it and on current policies which block it. No educator, could fail to enjoy or benefit from this book.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The Difference between Belief and Knowledge. The assumption that knowledge can be defined in terms of belief is considered to be mistaken. Since Gettier problems are shown to be misconstrued, the question cannot arise whether his conditions for knowledge are sufficient for claiming ``knowledge is justified true belief''. Ayers' conditions for knowledge in addition with a specific stipulation proof to be instructive for elaborating the differences between knowledge and belief.

Cobb's stated purpose in this book is to inquire into what is distinctive about Christianity and into its claim to finality. Hence half the book is taken up with the explication of other "structures of existence" which antedated or which have paralleled "Christian Existence." For Cobb, the term existence refers to how a subject relates itself to itself and what it is in and for itself. Cobb traces the move from the primitive self, which is not yet conscious of itself (...) as a self, across the threshold to "axial" man who breaks with the primitive mythic age by exhibiting a "seat of existence" or center of consciousness which involves a new role for rationality and which for the first time subordinates the unconscious to the conscious. The particular structures of axial existence which Cobb explores are Buddhist Existence, Homeric Existence, Socratic Existence, and Prophetic Existence. In contradistinction to these, Christian existence emerges as the crossing of a new threshold: it is spiritual existence expressing itself in love. Cobb's efforts to fulfill the second purpose of the book are half-hearted and unconvincing, a fact perhaps consistent with the book's objectivity: it is not Christian apologetics. Cobb's well known Whiteheadianism is only subtly and incidentally evident in this work, although occasionally it is used directly to expand and enrich certain explanations. The print in the book is annoyingly small.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This introduction to quantum mechanics requires little previous knowledge of physics. The book consists of three separate projects completed with varying degrees of success. The first chapters discuss classical physics with special attention to the concepts of matter and light. The middle chapters are devoted to quantum physics itself and how it developed from, and accounted for, problematic phenomena of earlier physics. Detailed, although not heavily mathematical, attention is given to the key experiments of quantum physics. These chapters go on (...) to discuss the so-called elementary particles, conservation laws, "strangeness," spin, various field theories, and other topics of current research. The final chapters are devoted to the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics. This section, focused mainly on causality and free will, is superficial and disappointing--of more interest to ethics and theology than to the philosophy of science. The philosophical remarks which were made parenthetically in the first two sections of the book were more provocative and might well have been expanded in this section. If this last section were eliminated, the first section abbreviated, and the book released in paperback, the book would be a better buy as informative introduction to quantum mechanics. There are many diagrams, tables, illustrations, and photographs, as well as a glossary of technical terms and a critical bibliography.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Wicker's concern is to build a philosophical and justificational foundation for a "Christian radicalism" which can serve to synthesize the two modern secular themes of self-determination and communalism. He explores particular secular theories of perception, language, and society and rejects them as irrelevant to modern realities. He then constructs in their place three sacred theories, where "sacred" is to be understood not as a sheltered corner of our experience but rather as the basis of the more general intersubjectivity which defines (...) man-in-society. He draws on Merleau-Ponty for a theory of perception, Wittgenstein for a theory of language, and Marx for a theory of society. All three theories find man in a closer participating relation with his world environment than do their rejected alternatives. These three theories suggest three modes of being-in-the-world: the bodily, the linguistic, and the economic, all of which are expressive—the latter in the sense that it involves the transformation of environment into expressiveness. The conjunction of the three modes, then, defines our community life. Wicker uses George Eliot, Dickens, Orwell, and William Golding to show how various human attitudes toward environment are manifest in literature. These attitudes are classifiable into the secular—environment as passive context for human life—and the sacred—environment as fraught with primordial significance which man shares and of which he is part. Wicker further justifies his vision of Christianity with the aid of Levy-Bruhl, van der Leeuw, and Eliade whose studies in primitive religions fructify Wicker's notion of the sacred. The book ends with a theological formulation of its main themes involving new translations of old doctrines. The book is a brave effort to revitalize with secular insights a moribund Christianity and to point it to its own roots in the foundations of man.—S. O. H. (shrink)

The book begins with four case studies and works its way through various manifestations, descriptions, and explanations of those new cultural attitudes toward sex called the sexual revolution. Much of the emphasis is on co-marital sex because the author feels that this area has been largely ignored in the recent literature on the subject. The book is well written and adequately researched; its subject matter obviates any need for it to struggle for the reader's attention. The final chapters cover "The (...) Playboy Philosophy," a report by some British Friends entitled Towards a Quaker View of Sex, and ethical pragmatism. The author's conclusions grope toward a "morality beyond morality" and an ethical pluralism.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This is an extremely simplified yet remarkably thorough introduction to how computers work. It is for the "computer widow" and the interested layman. I think it would well serve as a minimal grounding for the philosopher forced by his colleagues and others into discussions of artificial intelligence. The language is condescendingly simple with each new technical term introduced with appropriate fanfare and placed in italics. The exposition is accompanied by many diagrams and examples. The book covers the binary operation of (...) the computer and the role of symbols: how they are interpreted, how they get in to the computer, how they get out, how they are stored, and the logical categories by which they are processed. It discusses the control process by which the sequential order of computer operations is determined and the role of the programmer. The latter chapters of the book discuss a number of issues relating to the socio-economic implications of the widespread use of computers. Crowley takes great pains to point out the limitations of computers both with respect to current applicability and to future developments. He defends the computer as a potentially humanizing force in spite of its dehumanizing aspects. The book contains a short critical bibliography.--S. O. H. (shrink)

These papers were delivered at the 1966 Meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. They all deal in some way with education and professional training, although, in spite of the subtitle's enticement, there is almost no discussion of strategy for change in higher education. There is much hard analysis of what is going on in higher education and even a little musing about how things might or should be, but (...) the major concern is not really with change. The book opens with three background essays on educating for responsibility, on civic education in the techno-scientific age, and on educating for character in the arts and in the various disciplines. There follows a section on some professional aspects of education and the schools, including an essay by Daniel Bell on education and social change. Next come sections on Law, Business, the Ministry and their slant on education and training. Just before the appendices relating to the Conference there is a section of miscellaneous papers covering everything from police to LSD including language-consciousness and the mass media. Responsibility is a theme that carries through the essays. The three-year delay in publication is unfortunate. What one expects today from a book on change in higher education is much different and much more than these 1966 essays are able to give.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Sleeper is a New Testament scholar, and half of the book is concerned with building the subtitle's "Biblical Foundations for Social Ethics." This part of the project is pursued with care, freshness, and originality. The part of the book dealing with race relations and the Christian is a term-paper type survey of what current thinkers are thinking on race and the Christian conscience. There are a few attempts to integrate these chapters with the biblical scholarship, and, where these attempts occur, (...) they are generally successful--the only threads of unity between the various parts of the book. It is a shame that Sleeper's strengths as a biblical scholar are burried in this primer for white Christians.--S. O. H. (shrink)

With a few exceptions all the essays in this issue of Daedalus are biographies of world intellectual and political leaders. Erik Erikson's "psycho-historical" examination of Gandhi is followed by sketches of Nkrumah, Ataturk, de Gaulle, Bismarck, Andrew Johnson, Newton, James Mill, and William James. There are three exceptions to the biographical motif: 1) an essay on charisma which, although it does not go much beyond Weber, does offer a concise anatomy of the various dimensions of this slippery category which is (...) an underlying theme throughout many of the biographies; 2) a short essay proposing that obstacles to change in underdeveloped countries are connected with obstacles to the perception of change; and 3) an essay which examines the relation of the American intellectual-academic community to government during the first half of this century. Dankwart Rustow's introductory essay consists of "scattered remarks" on various methodologies for the exploration of the anatomy of leadership. His organizing themes are leadership as communication, leadership as learning process, and leadership as sense of timing.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Taken as a whole this book is not by Collingwood as much as it is about him. The selections read like extended quotations marshalled to defend and justify Rubinoff's interpretation of Collingwood which he sets forth in the introductions. Rubinoff admits, however, that the selections are arranged according to his interpretation of Collingwood which is roughly as follows: religion begins its development in a dogmatic stage characterized by feeling and emotion in which it views itself as a separate and autonomous (...) form of life claiming absolute truth for itself. From this stage of pure faith it passes to a stage of reason, the transition offering the possibility of a "philosophical rapprochement between faith and reason." In the process it turns out that art and philosophy are also engaged in this effort of mind-trying-to-know-itself and thus become identified with one another in that respect. The rapprochement between faith and reason is still inadequate at this stage as it over-emphasizes the identity of faith and reason while underplaying their differences. Thus a dialectical theory of truth and reality as overlapping modes of being is needed to show that faith and reason are distinct but not separate areas. The whole process sees religion as first a form of self-making, then in terms of the self constituting itself as a self, and finally as a form of absolute self-making. The book should not be considered as other than an exercise in historical theology. Collingwood has little to bring to current theological discussion. In fact Rubinoff's comments are often more provocative than Collingwood's, presenting what is important in Collingwood and offering interpretations that charitably enhance his relevance.--S. O. H. (shrink)

In sound, clear, and relentless argumentation Neville makes the case for God as being-itself. God as being-itself is indeterminate. Neville explores several theories that opt for the determinacy of being-itself and exposes the weaknesses of each. As indeterminate, being-itself is the ontological unity of the various determinations of being, and as such transcends them. This transcendent, indeterminate being-itself effects the unity of the determinations of being by creating them ex nihilo. The book spends some time exploring the structure of the (...) distinction between God and the created world, concluding that that distinction is itself determinate and created. God is not only transcendent for Neville, he is also present. He has some conditional features. However, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on transcendence. Neville rejects Hartshorne and insists that God is not conditioned by the determinations of being. Part II of the book is largely methodological, showing the move from "methodological dialectic" to "constitutive dialectic" in order to demonstrate how knowledge of this God is possible. The third part is an effort to connect religious experience with the constructs of Part I. Neville has one of those welcome styles in which the book offers a running commentary on itself: where it has been, where it is, where it is going, and how its success or failure might be judged. This is an important book, but more for its thoroughness and clarity than for its originality.--S. O. H. (shrink)